@article {BF-4277,
	title = {Householders{\textquoteright} safety-related decisions, plans, actions and outcomes during the 7 February 2009 Victorian (Australia) wildfires},
	journal = {Fire Safety Journal},
	volume = {61},
	year = {2013},
	month = {10/2013},
	pages = {175-184},
	chapter = {175},
	abstract = {This study examined decisions made by householders under wildfire threat. Data were obtained from interviews with survivors of severe wildfires in Victoria (Australia) on 7 February 2009 which killed 172 civilians and destroyed more than 2000 homes. Prior to this, Australian fire agency community wildfire safety policy was that residents should: {\textquoteleft}Prepare, stay and defend or leave early{\textquoteright}. Most of the 223 interviewees who stayed and defended did so because this was their wildfire safety plan, and they believed that they would be successful despite the predicted extreme fire danger weather. In 79\% of cases, defence was successful; for the remaining 21\% the house was destroyed and several lives were imperilled. Of the 216 who left for a safer location only 39\% said that this was their wildfire safety plan; for most, the action of leaving was triggered by realisation of the imminent threat posed by the fire; 36\% self-evacuated under hazardous conditions. The findings suggest that community wildfire safety programs should emphasize: (a) the risks associated with staying to defend a property; and (b) how householders should prepare in order to leave safely if a fire threatens.},
	keywords = {Community wildfire safety, Decision making, Evacuation, Property defence, Risk perception, Wildfire survival},
	doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.firesaf.2013.09.003},
	url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S037971121300146X},
	author = {Jim McLennan and Elliott, Glenn and Omodei, Mary and J Whittaker}
}
@proceedings {BF-3753,
	title = {Getting the best bang for your buck: Ad hoc or pre-formed incident management teams?},
	year = {2012},
	pages = {67=68},
	abstract = {An ongoing challenge for agencies managing wildfires is ensuring the effectiveness of their incident management teams (IMTs). In recent years there has been growing interest in the benefits of using pre-formed IMTs, leading to a number of agencies adopting their use. An important feature of pre-formed teams is their high levels of intra-team familiarity. The implementation of pre-formed IMTs has, in part, been based on the expectation that greater familiarity and member knowledge enables superior team performance.
...},
	url = {http://www.iawfonline.org/pdf/3rd\%20Human\%20Dimensions\%20Conference\%20Proceedings\%20-\%20FINAL.pdf},
	author = {Peter Hayes and Omodei, Mary}
}
@article {BF-3339,
	title = {Householder decision-making under imminent wildfire threat: stay and defend or leave?},
	journal = {International Journal of Wildland Fire},
	volume = {online early},
	year = {2012},
	month = {July 2012},
	abstract = {The study examined aspects of decision-making that distinguish between those who stay and defend their
property and those who leave for an assumed safer location when a community comes under imminent threat from a severe
wildfire. The data were obtained from field interviews with 49 survivors of the Murrindindi wildfire (Victoria, Australia,
7 February 2009) in which 38 people perished and that destroyed the small township of Marysville. Uncertainty about the
level of threat was a major feature of the decision-making context in the period immediately preceding the impact of the
fire. The majority of those who stayed and defended did so because they were committed to this plan of action. For most of
those who left, the action of leaving was triggered by realisation of the severe threat posed by the intensity or location of
the fire.},
	doi = {10.1071/WF11061},
	author = {Jim McLennan and Elliott, Glenn and Omodei, Mary}
}
@article {BF-3160,
	title = {Issues in Community Bushfire Safety: Analyses of Interviews Conducted by the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Research Task Force},
	year = {2012},
	month = {March 2012},
	abstract = {1. Immediately following the 7 February 2009 Victorian bushfires the Bushfire CRC organised a multi-agency Task Force to investigate and report on four aspects of the fires: arson (in collaboration with Victoria Police); fire behaviour; building survivability and infrastructure; and human behaviour and community safety. This last involved interviewing a cross-section of survivors about their experiences.


2. A total of 552 field interviews were conducted, resulting in 496 usable and informative interview transcripts. The transcripts were analysed following coding of aspects of survivors{\textquoteright} accounts. This report describes findings in relation to issues of householder bushfire knowledge, planning, preparedness, decisions, actions, threats, and hazards.


3. The aim of the report is to inform fire and emergency services agencies about survivors{\textquoteright} beliefs, plans actions, and experiences which may have implications for current community bushfire safety policies, priorities, programs, and practices.


4. Survivors{\textquoteright} accounts covered eight fire complexes: Beechworth, Bendigo, Bunyip, Churchill, Horsham, Kilmore, Murrindindi, and Narre Warren. Of the 496 transcripts, 360 were from residents of isolated rural properties, 99 were from residents of rural towns, and 37 were from residents of bushland-urban interface (suburban) streets.


5. Bushfire survival plans: It is estimated that 81\% of those who planned to stay and defend had undertaken more than minimal long term preparation to do so, while 34\% of those whose plan was to leave safely had undertaken more than minimal long term preparation to do so. Overall, 6\% of survivors planned to {\textquoteleft}wait and see{\textquoteright} before committing to a course of action; 9\% had an unclear household bushfire plan; 70\% of bushland-urban interface survivors had no household bushfire plan.


6. Actions on the day: Of the 496 survivors, 8\% were not at home on 7 February 2009 by chance; 2\% were not at home by choice to be somewhere safer; 28\% left safely before impact of a fire; 16\% left under hazardous conditions; 36\% stayed and defended their home successfully; 9\% stayed and attempted to defend but were unsuccessful; 2\% sheltered in place passively.


7. Overall, less than one-third of those interviewed had undertaken a high level of long term preparation to implement their household bushfire survival plan. A little more than half of the bushland-urban interface residents had undertaken no preparation. 


8. Although many of those interviewed did not provide information on awareness of fire danger weather, 50\% of those who did evidenced a high level of awareness of fire danger weather on 7 February 2009. However, these were all residents of isolated rural properties or towns: almost half of the bushland-urban residents were not aware of the predicted fire danger weather in relation to a potential threat to their property from a bushfire.


9. On five indicators of bushfire {\textquoteleft}readiness{\textquoteright} (long term preparation, awareness of fire danger weather, physical readiness for a possible bushfire, awareness of an approaching fire, and readiness to act upon knowledge of an imminent bushfire threat) residents of isolated rural properties described higher overall readiness levels than did residents of rural towns and bushland-urban interface residents{\textemdash}the latter described very low levels of readiness to survive a bushfire.


10. It seems that most residents of isolated rural properties had a reasonable level of awareness of bushfire risk in general, and had personalised this and undertaken long term property preparation to defend against bushfire which may have been adequate for {\textquoteleft}typical{\textquoteright} low to moderate intensity bushfires.


11. Most residents of bushland-urban interface dwellings did not understand themselves to be at-risk of bushfires, notwithstanding their proximity to bush or grassland. Residents of rural towns varied: some had an understanding of their risk similar to those who resided on isolated rural properties, some had an understanding similar to bushland-interface residents in relation to bushfire risk. Others had bushfire risk understandings intermediate between these.


12. There is some indication that those interviewees who stated an expectation that they would receive an official warning that their property was under threat, and/or that they would be given firefighting assistance had lower levels of general readiness to survive bushfires.


13. The most immediately useful sources of information for residents under bushfire threat were cues from the environment: smoke, flames, embers, sounds.


14. Most of those whose bushfire plan was to leave did so. Most of those who planned to stay and defend did so{\textemdash}however, 20\% decided to leave instead when they became aware of the intensity and/or proximity of the fire. Most of those whose {\textquoteleft}plan{\textquoteright} was to wait and see left, as did the majority of those who had no plan and most of those whose plan was unclear.


15. Most (80\%) of the homes which were defended actively survived, while 52\% of the homes not actively defended survived.


16. There was no compelling evidence that house survival was related to level of long term property preparation.


17. Compared with those who left, those who stayed and defended described higher levels of bushfire readiness in the form of: long term preparation; general knowledge of bushfires; awareness of predicted fire danger weather; physical readiness for a possible bushfire on the day; and awareness of an approaching fire. They were also less likely to report expecting a warning from authorities that their properties would be threatened by a bushfire.


18. Overall, those who stayed and defended were exposed to considerably higher levels of threat to life. However, 8\% of those who left were exposed to severe or extreme levels of threat when forced to take last resort shelter as a result of leaving at the last minute.


19. The major determinant of residents{\textquoteright} decisions to stay and defend was a prior commitment to this course of action, coupled with a belief that their preparations were adequate and that they were capable of defending successfully. For most of those who left, the decision to leave was a complex mix of neither intending nor preparing to defend, and triggering by information about: the proximity and intensity of the fire, the perceived threat posed by the fire, and concern for the safety of family members.


20. Almost two-thirds of those who stayed and defended reported that their efforts were compromised to a greater or a lesser degree by equipment failure{\textemdash}involving mostly water and power supply. Three quarters had no back-up plan in the event that defence failed and the house burned.


21. About one in five of those on their property on the day reported that the safety of pets and/or livestock was a factor in their decisions and actions.


22. One quarter of those on their property on the day indicated that a lack of official information and warnings about the fire potentially exposed them to greater risk.


23. It seems that many residents who choose to stay and defend are likely to: underestimate the potential severity of a bushfire attack; overlook vulnerabilities of the house structure; not take into account possible failure of equipment and physical capabilities; and not prepare for survival in the event that defence is unsuccessful and the house burns.


24. It seems that bushfire survival plans to leave safely are difficult for many at-risk householders to prepare for, commit to, and implement. Few are likely to relocate to a place of safety before there is some indication of an actual bushfire threat (not just a prediction of a total fire ban day), and many are unlikely to leave in the absence of a trigger event which leads them to conclude that their property is likely to come under attack and it is {\textquoteleft}time to leave{\textquoteright}.


It should be noted that that many of these findings based on survivors{\textquoteright} accounts correspond closely with Key findings concerning the bushfire fatalities reported by J. Handmer, S. O{\textquoteright}Neil, and D. Killalea in their report to the 2009 Victorian Bushfires
},
	url = {http://www.bushfirecrc.com/resources/issues-community-bushfire-safety-analyses-interviews-conducted-2009-victorian-bushfires-re},
	author = {Jim McLennan and Elliott, Glenn and Omodei, Mary}
}
@proceedings {BF-3756,
	title = {When residents come under imminent wildfire threat, what aspects of decision making distinguish those who stay and defend their home from those who leave?},
	year = {2012},
	pages = {87-89},
	publisher = {IAWF},
	abstract = {bushfires (wildfires) occurring on days of extreme fire danger following long periods of low rainfall (Haynes et al 2008). A review of fatalities in disaster-level bushfires suggested that: (1) most deaths occurred when residents fled at the last minute and resulted from either vehicle crash or radiant heat; and (2) many who died in or near houses were elderly or otherwise impaired (Handmer \& Tibbits, 2005). In its 2005 Position Statement the Australasian Fire Authorities Council concluded that: {\textquotedblleft}By extinguishing small ignitions, people of adequate mental, emotional, and physical fitness, equipped with appropriate skills and basic resources can save a building that would otherwise be lost to fire{\textquotedblright} (p 6). These considerations led to a general Australian fire agency community safety policy message to residents at-risk of bushfires to: {\textquoteleft}prepare, stay and defend or leave early{\textquoteright} (Tibbits et al. 2008).},
	url = {http://www.iawfonline.org/pdf/3rd\%20Human\%20Dimensions\%20Conference\%20Proceedings\%20-\%20FINAL.pdf},
	author = {Jim McLennan and Elliott, Glenn and Omodei, Mary}
}
@proceedings {BF-3057,
	title = {Bushfire Survival-Related Decision Making: What the Stress and Performance Research Literature Tells Us},
	year = {2011},
	month = {2011},
	publisher = {Bushfire CRC},
	address = {Sydney, Australia},
	issn = {978-0-9806759-9-3},
	url = {http://www.bushfirecrc.com/resources/pages-307-319-bushfire-survival-related-decision-making},
	author = {Jim McLennan and Elliott, Glenn and Omodei, Mary and Ilona M McNeill and Patrick Dunlop and Suss, J}
}
@proceedings {BF-3052,
	title = {Essential aspects of effective simulation-based training for incident management personnel},
	year = {2011},
	publisher = {Bushfire CRC},
	address = {Sydney, Australia},
	isbn = {978-0-9806759-9-3},
	issn = {978-0-9806759-9-3},
	url = {http://www.bushfirecrc.com/resources/pages-234-247-essential-aspects-effective-simulation-based-training},
	author = {Peter Hayes and Omodei, Mary}
}
@article {BF-2581,
	title = {Managing Emergencies: Key Competencies for Incident Management Teams},
	journal = {The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Organisational Psychology},
	volume = {4},
	year = {2011},
	pages = {1-10},
	abstract = {Each year Australian fire and land management agencies deploy Incident Management Teams (IMTs) to manage
bushfires. An important question is: what are the key competencies required for IMT personnel? Recent
research in high reliability organisations suggests that teamwork-related competencies are likely to be most
important because incident management depends critically upon interdependent team members, often operating
in dynamic, uncertain, time pressured, and high stakes environments. This study used semi-structured
interviews with experienced IMT personnel (N = 15) to identify 12 key competencies important for bushfire
IMT roles. Analysis of 30 bushfire incidents described by interviewees confirmed that three competencies (a)
interpersonal and communication skills, (b) leadership, and (c) IMT procedural knowledge were central.
Potential implications for organisational decision making in emergency contexts in general are outlined.},
	doi = {10.1375/ajop.4.1.1},
	author = {Peter Hayes and Omodei, Mary}
}
@article {BF-1303,
	title = {"The Human Factors Interview Protocol: A Tool for the Investigation of Human Factors Issues in Emergency Management"},
	journal = {Australian Journal of Emergency Management},
	year = {2007},
	author = {Elliott, Glenn and Omodei, Mary and Jim McLennan}
}
@article {BF-2337,
	title = {Decision Making Effectiveness in Wildfire Incident Management Teams},
	journal = {Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management},
	volume = {14},
	year = {2006},
	month = {03/2006},
	pages = {27 - 37},
	abstract = {During large scale wildfires, suppression activities are carried out under the direction of an Incident Management Team (IMT). The aim of the research was to increase understanding of decision processes potentially related to IMT effectiveness. An IMT comprises four major functions: Command, Operations, Planning, and Logistics. Four methodologies were used to study IMT processes: computer simulation experiments; analyses of wildfire reports; interviews with IMT members; and cognitive ethnographic studies of IMTs. Three processes were important determinants of IMT effectiveness: information management and cognitive overload; matching component function goals to overall goals; and team metacognition to detect and counter task-disruptive developments. These processes appear to be complex multi-person analogues of individual Incident Command processes identified previously. The findings have implications for issues such as: creating IMTs; training IMTs; managing IMTs; and providing decision support to IMTs.},
	doi = {10.1111/j.1468-5973.2006.00478.x},
	author = {Jim McLennan and Holgate, Alina M. and Omodei, Mary and Wearing, Alexander J.}
}
@article {BF-1304,
	title = {Identifying the Causes of Unsafe Firefighting Decisions: A Human Factors Interview Protocol},
	year = {2005},
	author = {Omodei, Mary and Jim McLennan and Reynolds, C}
}
@proceedings {BF-2576,
	title = {Networked Fire Chief: A Research and Training Tool that Targets the Human Factors Causes of Unsafe Decision Making in Wildfires},
	year = {2005},
	month = {April 26-28, 2},
	address = {Missoula, MT.},
	abstract = {A case is presented for the use of computer simulated wildland firefighting scenarios
(rather than only relying on field exercises, prescribed burns, and naturally-occurring
incidents), for the targeted investigation of underlying causes of unsafe decisions in the
context of wildland firefighting. We outline a set of requirements for a computer-based
wildland firefighting simulation tool to be adequate for the systematic investigation of
human factors underlying safety-compromising decisions. In introducing these
requirements, we draw particular attention to: (a) the need to distinguish between the
concepts of physical and psychological fidelity in simulation design; and (b) the relative
importance of each type of fidelity for investigating human decision making. Networked
Fire Chief (Omodei, Taranto and Wearing, 2003) is introduced as a proven research tool
for meeting the identified requirements. Networked Fire Chief is a wildland fire fighting
scenario generator specifically designed for research into psychological processes
involved in decision making under conditions of complexity, time-constraint, risk, and
uncertainty. In addition to use in human factors research, the program can also be used to
generate training scenarios ranging from training in fire behaviour to training in large
scale incident management skills.},
	author = {Omodei, Mary and Elliott, Glenn and Matthew Walshe and Wearing, Alexander J.}
}
@article {BF-1305,
	title = {Development of Computer Simulated Wildfire Scenarios for the Experimental Investigation of Unsafe Decision Making},
	year = {2004},
	institution = {Bushfire CRC Enhancing Safety Project (D2.3)},
	author = {Omodei, Mary and Elliott, Glenn and Matthew Walshe}
}
